Chapter 2 – General Principles of Searches, Seizures, and Information Gathering
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Read more: § 2.01. Suspicion-Based and Suspicionless Policing Activity
(a) A policing activity is “suspicion-based” when it is conducted with any cause to believe that the particular individual, place, or item subject to agency action is involved in prohibited conduct or is a threat to public safety, or that an individual is in need of aid.(b) A policing activity is suspicionless when it is…
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Read more: § 2.02. Information Gathering
For the purposes of these Principles, “information gathering” is any governmental action designed to acquire evidence of, or to deter, prohibited conduct that involves: (a) taking action that constitutes a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; (b) using technology that enhances the natural senses to detect or to record information; (c) obtaining personally…
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Read more: § 2.03. Establishing Prior Justification for Government Action through Warrants and Recordings
(a) The use of any information-gathering technique, as defined in § 2.02, which rises to the level of a constitutional “search” or “seizure” should be conducted pursuant to a judicially issued warrant, absent the ability to obtain one in a timely fashion.(b) When conducting a stop, search, frisk, or arrest, or engaging in other information-gathering…
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Read more: § 2.04. Use of Pretextual Policing
(a) Officers engage in pretextual policing when they take action for which they lack authority or justification by relying instead on another reason for which they do have authority or justification, even though they would not have taken the action but for the primary motivation.(b) Agencies and officers should not use pretextual policing as a…
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Read more: § 2.05. Acquiring or Accessing Data, Records, or Physical Evidence Held by Third Parties
(a) Absent federal, state, or local law to the contrary, agencies may request that a third party (an individual or an entity) turn over, or provide access to, data, records, or physical evidence that either belong to, or contain personally identifiable information about, an individual who is the target of an investigation. When making such…
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Read more: § 2.06. Police Use of Algorithms and Profiles
An agency should not use an algorithm or profile to direct police resources to a particular location, to identify potential targets for further investigation or surveillance, or to assess the risk of harm that individuals may pose to others unless: (a) the algorithm or profile has been shown to perform with acceptable accuracy, and it…
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Read more: § 2.07. Heightened Intrusions
(a) A policing action constitutes a heightened intrusion if it raises special privacy or dignitary concerns, poses a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to an individual, or significant damage to property.(b) A policing action that involves a heightened intrusion only should be used when society’s interest in its use clearly outweighs the harm that…
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Read more: § 2.08. Limiting the Impact of Outstanding Warrants
(a) All government actors, including policing agencies, should take steps to mitigate the harms attendant to unnecessary, inaccurate, or stale warrants.(b) Legislative bodies and courts should limit the use of arrest warrants as an automatic response to an individual’s failure to appear in court, and they should promote the use of alternative strategies to ensure…